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All Project Decisions Are Based on Models—Usually 
Mental Models
Every week—on projects large and small—project managers analyze many
situations and make tens, even hundreds, of decisions. Rarely, however, do
they stop to think about how they think.
No manager’s head contains a business, a project, people, resources, soft-
ware, or hardware. All human decisions are based on models, usually mental
models—of project roles and relationships, cost-schedule trade-offs, organi-
zational structures, and so on—created out of each person’s prior experiences,
training, and instruction (Hunt, 1989). These are the deeply ingrained assump-
tions, generalizations, and even pictures and images we form of ourselves,
others, the environment, and the things with which we interact. People base
their models on whatever knowledge they have, real or imaginary, naïve or
sophisticated (Norman, 1988, p. 38). Once formed, these cognitive constructs
not only provide a basis for interpreting what is currently happening, but they
also strongly influence how we act in response (Chapman & Ferfolja, 2001).
We like to think (and most of us believe) that well-adjusted individuals
possess relatively accurate mental models of themselves, their jobs, and
their environment. Unfortunately, this isn’t the case. A great deal of research
in cognitive psychology has revealed that mental models are only simplified
abstractions of the experienced world and are often incomplete, reflecting a
world that is only partially understood (Chapman & Ferfolja, 2001; Peterson &
Stunkard, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Everyone, from the greatest genius to the most ordinary clerk, has to adopt
mental frameworks that simplify and structure the information encountered
in the world. . . . [mental models] keep complexity within the dimensions our
minds can manage. . . . But beware: Any [model] leaves us with only a partial
view of the problem. Often people simplify in ways that actually force them to
choose the wrong alternatives. (Russo & Shoemaker, 1989, p. 15)
Project managers are no exception.
This article is part of an ongoing program of research to study the role
mental models play in project decision making. Specifically, this article
examines models of project planning and control, discusses some of their
limitations, and proposes tools to address the associated deficiencies.
System Dynamics Microworld for the Study of Project 
Decision Making
To date, much of the research conducted to examine the role mental models
play in human judgment and choice has been limited to the study of static-
type decision tasks (Gonzalez, Vanyukov, & Martin, 2005). The task of man-
aging a project—a dynamic decision-making task—differs from the static
variety customarily studied (e.g., in cognitive psychology) in at least three
ways: (1) it involves a series of decisions rather than a single decision; (2) the
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decisions are interdependent; and 
(3) the environment changes, both
autonomously and as a consequence of
the subjects’ decisions (Brehmer, 1990).
Such dynamic-type decision tasks have
been likened to the pursuit of a target
that not only moves, but also reacts to
the actions of the pursuer. This not only
complicates the task for the decision
maker, it has also (until relatively
recently) made such tasks exceedingly
difficult to study.
. . . the study of real-time, dynamic
decision making requires new forms
of research technology. One cannot
study dynamic tasks using the ordi-
nary paper-and-pencil approach of
psychological research. Instead,
interactive computer simulations of
dynamic tasks are required. The
technology for this has only recently
become available in psychological
laboratories.
Most later experiments on dynamic
decision making have used computer




the replication of complex dynamic
environments—with moving targets
that react to the decision maker—and
provide a degree of control not easily
obtained in field settings (Sterman,
2000). In a microworld-type experi-
mental environment—unlike in real
life—the effect of changing one factor
can be observed while all other factors
are held unchanged.
For our research program, we devel-
oped and used such an experimental
microworld. Our project management
simulator—a system dynamics model
of software project management—was
developed as part of an empirical case
study to study and model the software
development process at one of NASA’s
flight centers. The model captures the
richness and complexity of the NASA
software development environment in
great detail, and uniquely integrates the
engineering-type functions (designing,
coding, and quality assurance) together
with the management-type functions
(planning, controlling, and staffing).
(The model’s structure and its valida-
tion are described in detail in Abdel-
Hamid and Madnick [1991].)
Analogous to the flight simulators
that pilots use to practice on and learn
about the complexities of flying an
aircraft, a project management micro-
world provides a virtual practice field
for managers to “fly” a project and
experience the long-term conse-
quences of their decisions (Sterman,
1992). In a typical experimental sce-
nario, our subjects “play” the role of the
project’s manager—making project cost
and schedule estimates, monitoring
progress, and making staffing and other
resource decisions over the life of the
software project.
Over the last two decades, close to a
thousand experimental subjects partic-
ipated in our experiments. Many were
graduate students (masters’ students in
a computer systems management cur-
riculum who had an average 10 years of
work experience). In addition, several
hundred practicing mangers (executive-
education participants) also participat-
ed. Many in that latter group were sen-
ior managers who had spent most of
their careers overseeing complex proj-
ects for commercial enterprises and
government agencies (Sengupta, Abdel-
Hamid, & Van Wassenhove, 2008).
Seeing Two Loops . . . But Only
One at a Time
Human decision behavior, empirical
studies demonstrate, is highly adaptive
(Payne, Johnson, Bettman, & Coupey,
1990). When tackling complex decision
tasks, for example, people draw upon a
repertoire of heuristics (mental models)
and adapt their decision-making strate-
gies to the perceived demands of the
task (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Project management proved to be a
good case in point.
Among the most striking examples
of contingent judgment in the project
management domain are the adapta-
tions that managers make in their
staffing strategies as a project progress-
es through the life cycle. Staffing deci-
sions are doubly interesting to study
because they are among the most con-
sequential decisions a project manager
makes—with significant impacts on
project cost, schedule, and quality. To
illustrate, consider the typical staffing
pattern of Figure 1 (curve 1).
As mentioned earlier, the software
project used in our experiments is a sim-
ulation of a real NASA project that was
conducted to develop software for pro-
cessing satellite telemetry data. At the
start of the project, the system’s size was
estimated to be 400 tasks,1 and the pro-
ject’s cost and duration were estimated
to be 1,100 person-days and 320 days,
respectively. As often happens on soft-
ware projects, the system’s size grew over
time—to 600 tasks—because of added
system requirements (see curve 3).
The plots of Figure 1 are not the
results actually observed on the real
NASA project (we’ll see those later);
rather, they portray typical results
obtained in our simulation-based
experiments (using the simulated
NASA project). The subject’s task—as
project manager—was to track the pro-
ject’s progress using status reports gen-
erated at different stages of the project
(by the “simulated” project team), and
decide whether to update cost and
schedule estimates, increase or
decrease staff level, and reallocate staff
among the various project activities
(such as among development and qual-
ity assurance). The experimentation
environment automatically tracked not
only the decisions the subjects made
(e.g., how much staff they hired/fired),
but also what status reports they used
and how much time they spent on the
1 A task is a unit of work to build (design, code, and test) a
software module of average size—say, 50 lines of code.
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different tasks. To gain deeper insight
into our managers’ mental models, we
also conducted postgame debriefings
where we asked the subjects to verbal-
ize the assumptions they made while
making the various project decisions.
The staffing pattern of Figure 1—
selected because it was typical—mirrors
the profile one commonly observes in
practice, with the project starting with a
small core team, gradually building up
staff size through the detailed design
and coding phases, and ultimately with
the staff level tapering off as the project
enters the final testing phase. Note also
how in the early stages of the project, as
the project’s size was growing, the man-
ager held the completion date steady.
According to DeMarco (1982), the incli-
nation not to adjust a project’s schedule
early in the life cycle is quite common. It
arises, he argued, because of political
pressures. For example, a manager may
resist adjusting the schedule comple-
tion date early in the project because
he/she might fear that it’s too risky to
show an early slip to the customer (or
the boss) or that if he/she re-estimates
early, they risk having to do it again later
(and looking bad twice).
To system dynamicists—who are
“conditioned” to spot feedback structures
in systems—the staffing profile of Figure
1 itself suggests that the staffing decision
is driven by two distinct mental models: a
negative feedback model early in the life
cycle and a positive feedback model in
the later stages. Our postproject debrief-
ings would indeed confirm that and help
reveal the loops’ causal structures.
Early in the life cycle, the subjects’
mental model of the planning and con-
trol task is shown in Figure 2. Project
resources (such as manpower, develop-
ment tools, equipment, etc.) are
acquired and applied to accomplish
project work. As project work is accom-
plished, the stock of project tasks per-
ceived remaining declines. By tracking
the rate at which this happens (vis-à-
vis the planned rate of progress), the
manager can determine if the project’s
forecast completion time needs to be
updated. If the forecasted completion
time (what the manager believes is
likely to happen) and the scheduled
completion date (what’s promised to
the customer) start to diverge, the
manager can try to adjust the size or
allocation of the project’s resources in
order to close the gap and bring the
project back on track. This planning
and control loop is not a one-time
affair but rather is a continuous
process that goes on throughout the
life cycle.
The loop of Figure 2 encompasses
the archetypical goal-seeking feedback
strategy we rely on—both consciously
and subconsciously—to control many
processes in daily life: where the state
of some system we aim to control is
compared to our goal for the system,
and if a discrepancy is detected, correc-
tive action is taken to close the gap and
bring the system back in line with the
goal. Indeed, such a negative feedback
process underlies all goal-oriented
behavior. Nature evolves such goal-
seeking feedback mechanisms, and
humans invent them as controls to
keep system states within desired
bounds (Meadows, 1999). For example,
the homeostatic process built into our
physiology to maintain body core tem-
perature is such a process, as is the
human-built thermostat that keeps a
room’s temperature at a desired level.
Notice, however, that this initial
strategy—opting to maintain the com-
pletion date steady while willing to
adjust the staff resource to avert poten-
tial project delays—is reversed late in
the life cycle. In the later stages of the
project (beyond day 300 in Figure 1), the
staffing level is held steady and project
delays are handled by extending the pro-
ject’s completion date instead. In terms
of the goal-seeking structure of Figure 2,
this means that at the later stages, the
project manager sought to close the per-
ceived gap between scheduled and fore-
cast completion dates by adjusting the
goal instead of adjusting the resources.
In our postexperimental debriefings,
we asked the participants to explain the
reasons why they refrained from hiring
more staff late in the project and pre-
ferred instead to extend the completion
date. Their answers revealed that their
mental models adapted—just as the con-
tingent theory of judgment predicts—as
the project progressed through the life
cycle. More specifically, their responses
indicated two interesting things: (1) the

































Figure 1: Typical project behavior.








which drove their decisions early on, no
longer did in the later stages and (2) there
was remarkable consistency with regard
to the rationale that drove the shift.
Recall that in the mental model of
Figure 2 there is an implicit direct rela-
tionship between project resources and
work rate—that is, the “expectation”
that an increase in project resources
boosts the work rate. While this may be
“approximately” true early in a project’s
life cycle, most participants understood
that it is almost never true in the later
stages. A simplistic linear relationship
between project resources and work
rate ignores the fact that adding more
people (especially late in the project)
often leads to higher communication
and training overheads, which tend to
dilute the team’s overall productivity.
These effects create the phenomenon
referred to as Brooks’s Law: “adding
more people to a late software project
makes it later.” (Brooks’s Law was first
publicized in The Mythical Man-Month:
Essays on Software Engineering [Brooks,
1975], which remains on the must-read
list of most project managers.)
Assimilation delays are a big part of
the Brooks’s Law phenomenon. These
are the delays incurred when assimilat-
ing new staff into the project team—
that is, bringing them up to speed on
the details of the project and providing
them with the necessary training on the
project’s hardware platform, develop-
ment tools, and methodologies. This
assimilation process is often time-
consuming—generally ranging from 
2 to 6 months—and imposes a signifi-
cant drag on productivity. During
assimilation, not only is the new
employee not fully productive, but
because the “hand-holding” is typically
performed by the veterans on the proj-
ect, the productivity of the veterans also
suffers.2
While the productivity “hit” associat-
ed with the hiring and assimilation of
new staff may be absorbed and, there-
fore, “safely” discounted early in the life
cycle, the impact is more problematic
when staff are added late (as Brooks
argued convincingly). This was under-
stood by our experimental subjects—
many, as mentioned, were experienced
managers. Hence, the mental model that
drove their staffing decisions late in the
life cycle was not the goal-seeking struc-
ture of Figure 2 but rather the so-called
“Brooks’s Law feedback loop” of Figure 3.
This second loop is different from
the negative feedback loop of Figure 2
in a very important way—it is a positive
loop. Whereas negative loops counter-
act and oppose change, positive loops
by contrast tend to reinforce or amplify
it (Sterman, 2000, p. 12). You can follow
this self-reinforcing dynamic by walk-
ing yourself around the loop: increasing
staff resources through hiring lead to
higher communication and training
overheads, which lowers productivity
and slows work rate, thereby increasing
(rather than decreasing) the gap
between project status and plan, which
induces further staff additions.
To avoid the vicious trap of Brooks’s
Law, most project managers in our
experiments refrained from adding staff
later in the life cycle and opted to close
the gap between perceived project status
and plan the other way—by extending
the schedule. (That’s the goal adjust-
ment path shown as the upper loop in
Figure 3.) Essentially, then, what they
were doing was seeking to close the gap
between project status (the state of the
system they were striving to control)
and the plan (the system’s goal) by low-
ering the goal rather than by taking cor-
rective action(s) to bring the project’s
state into line with the plan. (In the sys-
tems thinking literature, this is referred
to as the “goal erosion” dynamic.)
Binary Thinking: How “One Plus
One Equals One”
In reality, it is important to realize, both
loop effects—the negative loop of
Figure 2 and the positive loop of Figure
3—are present and operating in the
project from beginning to end. Project
management, in other words, is a mul-
tiloop nonlinear feedback system—not a
“one-pony show” (Figure 4). But rather
than seeing this multiloop (more com-
plex) reality, our findings suggest that
most project managers view the world
through a simpler single-loop lens. The
“single-loop illusion” arises because the
















Figure 2: Planning and control (negative) feedback loop.
2 For reasons we will understand shortly, the average
assimilation period on the NASA project was unusually
short—only 4 weeks long. Because of that, it was among
the project characteristics explicitly communicated to the
participants in the pre-experimental orientation.
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cause the relative strengths (hence, vis-
ibility) of the loops to shift over time
(Forrester, 1987). As a feedback loop
gains strength (relative to other loops in
the system), it dominates and, hence,
becomes more salient.
Reducing a complex phenomenon or
choice to a binary set—negative or posi-
tive feedback in this case—is no aberra-
tion. It is a convenient (occasionally suf-
ficient) mental shortcut we routinely
rely on to simplify our world. And not
just in thinking about project manage-
ment, but also in many judgmental tasks
we face. Indeed, it almost seems to be
part of human nature (Wood &
Petriglieri, 2005).
As Stephen Breyer, the U.S. Supreme
Court Associate Justice, observes in his
book Breaking the Vicious Circle:
We simplify radically; we reason with
the help of a few readily understand-
able examples; we categorize (events
and other people) in simple ways
that tend to create binary choices—
yes/no, friend/foe, eat/abstain, safe/
dangerous, act/don’t act. The result-
ing categorizations do not always
accurately describe another person
or circumstance, but they help us
make quick decisions, most of which
prove helpful. (Breyer, 1993, p. 35)
Most of which!
While binary thinking may help us
minimize cognitive effort and make
quick decisions, it dramatically over-
simplifies things. And this, as Justice
Breyer cautions later in his book, can
seriously inhibit our understanding of a
complex problem or situation. In the
case of managing the staffing level on a
software project, it can seriously under-
mine a manager’s capacity to deter-
mine the optimal staffing level.
Feedback-Loop Arithmetic: One
Positive Loop  One Negative
Loop Equals . . .
As mentioned, project management
belongs to the class of multiloop non-
linear feedback systems. That’s the same
class that defines some of our most
complex technological systems, includ-
ing chemical refineries, autopilots, and
communication networks. In such mul-
tiloop systems, discerning the dynamic
behavior of any one of the individual
loops in isolation (the loops of Figures 2
or 3) may be reasonably obvious, but
figuring out the behavior of multiple
interconnected feedback loops (some
positive, some negative) can be tricky.
The complexity of the bookkeeping task
is further compounded when there are
significant nonlinearities and delays in
the system that alter the relative
strengths of the loops over time. This is
precisely what happens in a software
project: as a project progresses through
the life cycle, nonlinear interactions and
delays dynamically alter the relative
strength of the Brooks’s Law loop.
To illustrate the dynamic complexi-
ties, consider the following hypotheti-
cal project situation:
A medium-sized software project
that is currently at the midpoint in
its life cycle is falling slightly behind
schedule. At that point, the project
team is composed of five team
members and the team’s average
productivity is clocked at 100 lines of
code (LOC) per person-month. With
the project falling behind schedule,
the project’s manager is considering
adding one additional person.
As already discussed, newly hired
staff often require considerable hand
holding to get up to speed. And because
the training of the newcomers—both
technical and social—is usually carried
out by the old-timers, adding staff to a





















Figure 3: The Brooks’s Law feedback loop that dominates late in the life cycle.








team’s average productivity. On this
hypothetical project situation, the
hire/no-hire decision will rest on the
manager’s answer to the following ques-
tion: Will the temporary drain on pro-
ductivity be shallow and/or brief enough
that it is more than compensated for by
the gains in productivity achieved later
when assimilation is complete?
The “unequivocal answer” to that
question is: It depends. That’s because
the magnitude of the initial “hit” to
team productivity and the length of the
assimilation delay are both organiza-
tion- and project-specific. They depend
on the quality of the people hired and on
whether the project is simple or com-
plex, familiar or one of a kind.
To demonstrate the effects, consider
the two scenarios depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5 depicts—for two different
scenarios—the productivity values during
assimilation for the newly hired person
(ProdNew) and the five veterans (ProdOld).
In both cases, I am assuming that the pro-
ductivity of the five veterans on the proj-
ect drops by 10% (that is, to 90 LOC/per-
son-month [PM]) during the assimilation
period. In scenario 1—a run-of-the-mill
project—the productivity of the new hire
is not much lower than that of the veter-
ans—at 80 LOC/person-month. Thus, in
scenario 1, average productivity for the
expanded six-person team drops to 88
LOC/PM, while the team’s output increas-
es from 500 to 530 LOC/month. In sce-
nario 2—a more complex project—the
newcomer induces a bigger “productivity
hit,” with average team productivity drop-
ping to a lower 82 LOC/PM and the team’s
output decreasing to 490 LOC/month.
This means that in scenario 2 (but not sce-
nario 1), the addition of a new person to
the team induces a negative net contribu-
tion to the team’s output (of 490 – 500 
–10 LOC/month).
In both cases, the increased training
and communication overheads during
assimilation cause average productivity
to drop (to 88 LOC/PM in scenario 1 and
to an even lower 82 LOC/PM in scenario
2). The drop in average team productivi-




















Figure 4: Multiloop reality of project management.
Current Status:
•  Close to midpoint of project
•  5 people working on project
•  Average productivity: 100 LOC/Person-Month




ProdNew = 80 LOC/PM
ProdOld = 90% of 100
Average Prod   = 88 LOC/PM
Output             = 530 LOC/M
Scenario 2
Add 1 Person
ProdNew = 40 LOC/PM 
ProdOld = 90% of 100
Average Prod   = 82 LOC/PM
Output             = 490 LOC/M
Figure 5: Two project scenarios with different impacts on productivity.
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rise (since a project’s cost in person-days
is equal to project size [in LOC] divided
by average productivity). An increase in
project cost (in person-months) does
not, however, necessarily translate into
an increase in project duration. Total
team output in LOC/month (not average
team productivity) is what would deter-
mine that. More precisely, for the pro-
ject’s schedule to also suffer (together
with project cost), the drop in productiv-
ities must be large enough to render the
additional person’s net cumulative con-
tribution to the team’s output to be a
negative contribution. We need to calcu-
late the net contribution because an
additional person’s contribution to use-
ful project work (e.g., 40 LOC/month in
scenario 2) must be balanced against the
losses incurred by the veterans (the 10%
productivity drop experienced by the
five existing team members). And we
need to calculate the cumulative contri-
bution because while a new hire’s net
contribution might be negative initially,
as training takes place and the new hire’s
productivity increases (see Figure 6), the
net contribution becomes less and less
negative, and eventually (given enough
time on the project) the new person
starts contributing positively to the proj-
ect. (For example, at the point in Figure 6
where the new hire’s productivity grows
to 80 LOC/PM, his/her net contribution
would be the same as in scenario 1 [i.e.,
a positive 30 LOC/month].)
Only if net cumulative contribution
is negative will the addition of the new
staff member translate into a longer
project-completion time. Whether this
happens or not will be a function of the
complexity of the project, the quality
and experience of the added staff, and
the stage in the life cycle when they are
added. The earlier in the life cycle peo-
ple are added and/or the shorter the
training period needed (e.g., due to 
the high quality of new hires or the low
complexity/novelty of the project), the
more likely it is that the net cumulative
contribution will turn positive.
Conversely, the later in the life cycle that
people are added and/or the costlier the
assimilation process, the stronger the
“Brooks’s feedback loop” of Figure 4,
and the more likely it is that the net
cumulative contribution will remain
negative.
In scenario 2, for example, whether
or not the net cumulative contribution
turns positive by project’s end will
depend on the rate at which productivi-
ty improves and on the remaining time
to complete the project. Doing the nec-
essary “bookkeeping” to figure that out
is no trivial matter, however (Forrester,
1964). (Essentially, it involves solving a high-
order nonlinear differential equation—
a difficult task for all but the simplest
systems.) On a “live” dynamic project
(as opposed to the snapshot of Figure
5), the calculus is further complicated
by the fact that not one but several dif-
ferent types of individuals may be
added, and not necessarily at once but
at different times during the project.
Our own experimental results do
indeed suggest that, for most man-
agers, the bookkeeping task is far too
complex to accomplish by inspection
and intuition. Recall that in our experi-
ments, the commonly adopted staffing
strategy was to refrain from hiring staff
a little after the project’s midpoint
(around day 300 in Figure 1). (This sug-
gests an implicit assumption that the
net cumulative contribution turns neg-
ative beyond that point.) That strategy
led to a project duration of 440 days (as
seen in Figure 1)—a duration, it turns
out, that is far from optimal!
Before discussing what is optimal,
let us first see what actually transpired
on the real NASA project.
Figure 7 depicts the model’s simula-
tion of the real NASA project (the simu-
lation run used during model validation)
together with the project’s actual
results. As can be seen, the model’s out-
put closely matched the project’s actual
behavior (represented by the solid 
circles/triangles/squares in the figure).
Notice that the scale on the hori-
zontal (time) axis of Figure 7 is missing.
This is purposefully done so we 
may undertake a simple thought-
experiment—one that we often con-
duct in conjunction with our laboratory
experiments. To do that, first compare
NASA’s workforce pattern to that of
Figure 1. A simple comparison should
convince you that the staffing strategy at
NASA was a lot more “aggressive”—with
Scenario 2
Add 1 Person
ProdNew = 40 LOC/PM
ProdOld = 90% of 100
Average Prod   = 82 LOC/PM
Output             = 490 LOC/M







Figure 6: Productivity of a new hire picks up over time.








management willing to add significantly
to the workforce until fairly late into the
life cycle. (Note, in particular, the dra-
matic increase in workforce after time
T1.) This raises the following legitimate
question: How much did such an aggres-
sive (reckless?) hiring policy—one that
blatantly ignores the “lesson” of Brooks’s
Law—hurt the NASA project?
Contemplate that question for a
minute, and before reading further,
provide your best guess as to how much
longer you think the actual project took
as a result—that is beyond the 440 days
obtained with the workforce policy of
Figure 1.
• Contemplate for a few minutes the
implications of NASA’s “aggressive”
staffing policy.
• And provide your best guess: Project
duration  ___________ days.
The “Un-Wisdom” of
“Conventional Wisdom”
Typical answers we get range from 500
to 650 days. That’s a 15 to 50% “penalty”
our experimental managers slap onto
NASA’s management for forsaking the
lesson of Brooks’s Law.
On the real project, with its “anti-
Brooks” staff policy, project duration was
380 days! That’s approximately three cal-
endar months earlier than the “by-the-
book” workforce policy of Figure 1.
This result is often an absolute
“shock” to most participants—many, as
mentioned, were seasoned managers
who had spent most of their careers run-
ning software projects. And this invari-
ably triggers questions like: How can
such a policy work for NASA when it was
so dysfunctional at IBM? And does this
mean we should “repeal” Brooks’s Law?
To answer the first question, we
need to recall that the net cumulative
contribution is a dynamic variable
whose ultimate value is a function of
both the characteristics of the system
being developed and the people hired to
develop it. Our empirical results from
NASA do suggest that, in practice, it is
possible to compress communication
and assimilation overheads to the point
where the net cumulative contribution
remains positive even when staff are
added late—very late. These project’s
stats do not, however, explain the how.
To understand the cause behind the
causes, we need to dig a bit deeper into
NASA’s system/people characteristics.
Let’s start with system characteris-
tics. The satellite software that was being
developed on the project, while new and
unique, was not fundamentally different
from satellite software developed on ear-
lier projects. (This meant that, similar to
the run-of-the-mill scenario 1 of Figure 5,
ProdNew would be only moderately lower
than ProdOld.) As on earlier satellite proj-
ects, the software for this project was
being developed in parallel with the
design of the satellite’s hardware (its
processors and sensors). Over the years,
NASA managers learned the hard way
that such two-track projects are particu-
larly prone to late “surprises” when the
software and hardware subsystems are
first brought together. Inevitably, some
software/hardware components will fail
to meet specified functionality or per-
formance targets, and when that happens,
software is almost always where manage-
ment turns—because of economics—
to engineer a “detour solution.”
To manage in such an environment,
NASA’s software managers figured they
not only needed the capacity to add
staff on short notice, but also access to a
reliable pool of experienced software
designers and programmers who can be
counted on to contribute to a project
immediately when hired. In the particular
NASA flight center we studied, manage-
ment sought to achieve that by instituting
a long-term contractual arrangement
with a single contractor—in this partic-
ular case with the Computer Sciences
Corporation (CSC). Over the years, as a
result of the steady relationship, the
pool of CSC software professionals
became intimately familiar with the
NASA environment and the satellite
software, and when hired into a project
they were indeed able to contribute to
project work relatively quickly and with-
out incurring a great deal of communi-
cation or training overheads.
The policy helped NASA compress
both the hiring and assimilation delays
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Figure 7: Actual behavior on the NASA project.
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respectively) and caused the loss to pro-
ductivity during the relatively shallow
assimilation period to be minimal. On
our case-study project, the project’s
ultimate outcome suggests that—as a
consequence of these system/people
characteristics—adding manpower very
late into the project did not cause net
cumulative contribution to be negative.
(In the next section, I present a more
quantitative analysis of the impact.)
Which brings us to the second
question we posed: Does this mean we
must now repeal Brooks’s Law? To do
that on the basis of the above results
would in fact be inappropriate. And
that’s simply because the positive
results of NASA’s (aggressive) staffing
policy is an entirely company-specific
result. Thus, the answer to our second
question must be no.
What the results do underscore,
however, are the perils of blind adher-
ence to conventional wisdom and sim-
plistic one-size-fits-all prescriptions
(e.g., that “adding more people to a late
software project makes it later”). It is
not the first time (nor will it be the last)
that conventional wisdom has been
proven wrong. John Kenneth Galbraith,
the man who coined the phrase “con-
ventional wisdom,” did not consider it
a compliment. Conventional wisdom,
Galbraith often lamented, reflects our
tendency to associate truth with con-
venience. Because comprehending the
true character of a complex system or
problem can be “mentally tiring,” he
argued, people all too often adhere to
simplified conceptualizations, as
though to a raft, because they are easier to
understand. In Galbraith’s view, conven-
tional wisdom must be simple, convenient,
comfortable, and comforting—though
not necessarily true (Levitt & Dubner,
2005, pp. 89–90).
Combining the Strengths of
Mental Models and Computer
Models
While adding staff to a late project was
counter-productive at IBM (Brooks,
1987), the same policy worked well for
NASA. For project managers elsewhere,
the $64,000 question becomes: What
would work in my organization?
Figuring that out requires two
essential cognitive skills: the manager
needs to develop an adequate causal
model of his/her project environment—
what’s referred to in control theory as
the “operator’s” model. By that it is
meant acquiring structural knowledge
of the project environment—that is
understanding how system variables,
such as people and system characteris-
tics, hiring and assimilation delays, staff
experience/productivity, and the like,
are related and how they influence one
another. Second, to infer how the sys-
tem behaves in response to some inter-
vention the manager must be able to
“run” that model (Brehmer, 1990;
Conant & Ashby, 1970; Kleinmuntz &
Thomas, 1987). A perfect operator
model without a capability to “run” it is
of little practical utility (Sterman, 1994).
The ability to infer system behavior is
essential if the project manager is to
know how actions taken (such as adding
staff) will influence the system and,
thus, is essential in devising appropriate
interventions for change. The two
skills—understanding and prediction—
are needed together. And herein lies a
problem!
Experience from working with man-
agers in many environments indicates
that while they are generally capable 
of grasping the unique characteristics of
their environments (acquiring structur-
al knowledge), they are usually unable
to accurately determine the dynamic
behavior implied by these relationships
(running their operator models)
(Sterman, 2000). The human mind,
experiments consistently show, is an
excellent recorder of decisions, reasons,
motivations, and structural relation-
ships, but it is not that good (nor reliable)
at inferring the behavioral implications
of interactions over time (Forrester,
1979). Being able to “run” our mental
model of some system or situation, in
other words, is a much more difficult
task for us.
Luckily, that’s precisely where com-
puter modeling can help (Forrester,
1979). Unlike a mental model, a comput-
er simulator can reliably and efficiently
trace through time the implications of a
messy maze of interactions. And it can
do so without stumbling over phraseol-
ogy, cognitive bias, or gaps in intuition
(Richardson & Pugh, 1981). Computer
simulation is thus well suited to fill the
gap where human judgment is most
suspect. Furthermore, by tailoring
model parameters, computer-based tools
can be easily customized to fit the precise
specifications of different project/
organizational environments.
To answer our $64,000 question, we
thus need to combine the strengths of
the manager with the strengths of the
computer. The manager aids by specify-
ing relationships within his/her software
project environment (e.g., people and
system characteristics, hire and assimila-
tion delays, staff experience/productivi-
ty, etc.) and the computer then calculates
the dynamic consequences of these rela-
tionships (e.g., on cost and duration). To
demonstrate how this can be accom-
plished in practice, I discuss next how it
was done as part of the NASA case study.
The obvious place to start—since
we’re seeking to combine the strength of
mental models and computer models—
is to elicit the managers’ mental models
(in this case relating to project staffing).
To do that, we conducted one-on-one
structured interviews where we asked
the managers about the information
they used and how they used it in for-
mulating staffing decisions. This infor-
mation was then cross-checked with
reviews of historical project records.
From this we were able to map out a set
of (rather “nuanced”) heuristics that
governed NASA’s staffing policy.
Not unlike managers elsewhere,
NASA’s managers had to juggle a number
of conflicting objectives when determin-
ing the workforce level. One obvious
objective was to maintain the workforce
at the level they believed was necessary
to complete the project on its current
schedule. This workforce level was








referred to as the “indicated workforce
level” and was determined by dividing
the amount of effort perceived remain-
ing (in person-days) by the time remaining
(in days). In addition to this all-impor-
tant scheduling goal, consideration was
also given to the stability of the work-
force. What was interesting—and signifi-
cant—here was that the relative weigh-
ing between the desire to maintain work-
force stability on the one hand and the
desire to complete the project on time
was not static but changed dynamically
throughout the life of a project. To do
that, they conjured a mental heuristic—
which we dubbed the “Willingness to
Change the Workforce” (WCWF) heuris-
tic—that worked as follows:
Workforce Level Needed  (Indicated
Workforce Level)  (WCWF)  (Current
Workforce)  (1 – WCWF)
(1)
The WCWF is a weighing factor that
assumes values between 0 and 1, inclu-
sive. WCWF is itself composed of two
components—namely, WCWF_1 and
WCWF_2 (the two parts depicted in
Figure 8).3 To understand how it works,
assume for the moment that the WCWF
is only composed of, and is therefore
equal to, WCWF_1. In the early stages of
the project when “time remaining” is
generally much larger than the sum of
the “hiring delay” and the “average
assimilation delay” (which at NASA were
30 and 20 working days, respectively),
WCWF_1 would be equal to 1. When
WCWF  1, the “workforce level needed”
in equation (1) would simply be equal to
the “indicated workforce level”—that is,
management would be adjusting its
workforce size to the level it feels is need-
ed to finish on schedule.
Late in the project, when the 
“time remaining” drops below some
threshold—0.4 times the “time parame-
ter,” or 20 days in this case—the partic-
ular policy curve of Figure 8a suggests
that no more additions would be made
to the project’s workforce. At that stage,
WCWF_1 equals exactly 0. The “work-
force level needed” would thus be equal
to the “current workforce”—that is,
management maintains the project’s
workforce at its current level. Schedule
slippages at this late stage would, thus,
be handled by adjusting the schedule
completion date, and not through
adjustments to the workforce level.
As seen in Figure 8(a), the transition
from “hiring whatever is needed” to
“freezing all hiring” is not abrupt (bina-
ry). In the middle of the project—when
“time remaining” is between 0.4 and 1.5
times the sum of hiring and assimila-
tion delays—the WCWF_1 variable
assumes values between 0 and l. This rep-
resents situations where management
responds to schedule slippages by par-
tially increasing the workforce level and
partially extending the current sched-
ule to a new date.
As mentioned, WCWF_1 is only one
of two components to WCWF. To under-
stand the rationale behind the WCWF_2
formulation, we need to understand one
important aspect of the NASA software
development environment—namely,
that serious schedule slippages could not
be tolerated. That’s primarily because of
the ironclad satellite launch windows
they had to contend with. A satellite’s
launch window constituted a “maximum
tolerable completion date” (that’s how
they referred to it) that could not be
breached. Managers typically started
with that “maximum tolerable comple-
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Figure 8: Willingness to change the workforce policy curves.
3 Notice that the time axis in Figure 8 is a normalized meas-
ure of time—time remaining as a multiplier of the sum of
hiring assimilation delays.
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estimate of the project’s duration—with
some safety factor mixed in for good
measure—would work backgrounds in
time to derive a start date for the project.
For example, if the estimated project
duration is 10 months, and a 20% safety
factor is used, the project would be start-
ed 12 months before the “maximum tol-
erable completion date” (at the latest). If
such a project starts to fall behind sched-
ule, management’s reaction will depend
on how close they are in breaching the
“maximum tolerable completion date.”
As long as the “scheduled completion
date” is comfortably below the “maxi-
mum tolerable completion date,” deci-
sions to adjust the schedule, add more
people, or do a combination of both are
based on the balancing of scheduling
and workforce stability considerations as
captured by WCWF_1. However, if the
“scheduled completion date” starts
approaching the “maximum tolerable
completion date,” pressures develop that
override the workforce stability
considerations. That is, management
becomes increasingly willing to pay any
price necessary to avoid overshooting
the “maximum tolerable completion
date.” And this often translated into a
management that was increasingly will-
ing to add new people (plucked from
CSC) to the project.4
The development of such overrid-
ing pressures is captured through the
following formulation of the WCWF:
WCWF  MAXIMUM (WCWF_1, WCWF_2)
(2)
As long as “scheduled completion
date” is comfortably below the “maxi-
mum tolerable completion date,” the
value of WCWF_2 would be zero (see
Figure 8b)—that is, it would have no
bearing on the determination of WCWF,
and consequently on the hiring deci-
sions. When “scheduled completion
date” starts approaching the “maxi-
mum tolerable completion date,” the
value of WCWF_2 starts to gradually
rise. Because such a situation typically
develops toward the end of the project,
it would be at a point where the value of
WCWF_1 is close to zero and decreas-
ing. If the value of WCWF_2 does sur-
pass that of WCWF_1, the “willingness
to change the workforce” will be domi-
nated by WCWF_2 and, thus, the pres-
sures not to overshoot the “maximum
tolerable completion date.”
This WCWF heuristic is in essence
how NASA’s management intuitively
juggled the simultaneous effects of the
three interacting loops of Figure 4. It is
clever and it is compact . . . but is it opti-
mal? (Hint: No manager—even a math-
ematician at heart—can be expected to
accurately and reliably optimize that on
the basis of bare intuition [Forrester,
1979; Sterman, 2000].)
Among the important virtues of
simulation-type models is the capacity
to conduct perfectly controlled experi-
mentation where the effect of changing
one factor (e.g., staffing/WCWF policy)
can be observed while all other factors
are held unchanged. In real life, by con-
trast, many variables change simultane-
ously, confounding the interpretation of
managerial actions/decisions. Using
our microworld, we conducted a series
of controlled experiments to assess the
schedule and cost consequences of a
wide range of WCWF policies (while
holding other project parameters con-
stant).
Assessing first what’s optimal for
WCWF_2 turned out to be relatively
straightforward: NASA managers need-
ed to scrap it altogether. Re-simulations
of the project demonstrated that the
policy of unbridled late hiring (to des-
perately avoid overshooting the “maxi-
mum tolerable completion date”) is not
cost-effective—even with NASA’s rela-
tively compressed hire and assimilation
delays. This can be seen in Figure 9, where
the project’s base case performance (with
WCWF_2 intact) is compared to a re-
simulation in which WCWF_2 is elimi-
nated—that is, where WCWF 
WCWF_1. In the base case, as WCWF_2
kicks late in the life cycle, the staff level
rises sharply. But, this hire-until-we-
drop mentality, our results clearly indi-
cate, buys them very little savings.
Relative to the no WCWF_2 case, the
project saves only a few days in total
duration (less than 1%), while the pro-
ject’s cost (in person-days) increases by
a whopping 11%.5
Given these results, we dropped
WCWF_2 in our subsequent analyses
and reformulated the WCWF to be sole-
ly a function of WCWF_1. Besides the
obvious simplification, the reformula-
tion offers an added bonus: it extends
the generalizability of the results to the
larger universe of organizations where
time constraints are not as stringent as
those at NASA (i.e., where they do not
have to contend with a “maximum tol-
erable completion date”).
To assess what’s optimal for
WCWF_1, we had the option of assess-
ing its shape (how steep or flat) or its
“time parameter”—which regulates
where WCWF_1 is laterally positioned
on the time axis—or both. In this article,
I discuss how we optimized the latter—
the WCWF’s time parameter, which was
the issue that was of the most practical
concern to the NASA managers.
Determining where WCWF_1 should
optimally sit along the time axis is key to
determining the following three transi-
tions in policy: the transition from will-
ingness to hire whomever is needed
(early in the life cycle) to maintain the
schedule (when WCWF  1) leads to
(transition 2) handling potential delays
by partially increasing the workforce
level, and partially extending the sched-
ule (when 0  WCWF  1) leads to
(transition 3) freezing all hiring (when
WCWF  0).
Shifting the WCWF curve—and,
hence, the previously mentioned three
4Tight time commitments are, of course, not unique to
NASA. Many other organizations we studied that were
involved in developing embedded software systems (e.g.,
MITRE) experienced similar pressures. When developing
embedded software systems (e.g., such as a new weapon
system), serious schedule slippages are not tolerated
because the software is often on the critical path of the
larger system development effort, and hence a schedule
slippage can magnify into a very costly overrun.
5 These results suggest that late in the life cycle, the project’s
“vital statistics” fall in between scenarios 1 and 2 of Figure 5,
with net cumulative contribution of approximately zero.








transition points—to the right or left
along the X axis is easily accomplished
by simply recalibrating the value of the
“time parameter” (see Figure 8a). For
example, lowering the time parameter
from its base case value of 50 days shifts
the WCWF to the left and would mean
that hiring continues later into the life
cycle. Conversely, increasing this time
parameter to, say, 100 working days
would mean that the freeze on hiring
occurs much earlier in the project 
(at 0.4  100  40 days from comple-
tion, instead of the current 20 days).
We have simulated the project using
different time parameter values and, in
Figure 10, plot the consequences on the
project’s schedule and cost.
The results indicate that—in the
NASA environment—the net cumula-
tive contribution of new hires remains
positive as long as the “time parameter”
remains  35. While this means that late
hiring (up until approximately three
calendar weeks from completion) does
not cause delays, notice that it can
induce a sharp rise in project cost. Our
results suggest that the more prudent
strategy would be to keep the time
parameter value at  50 days. At that
level, late staff additions would save
time without excessively increasing
cost. A “time parameter” of 50 means
that NASA’s management could contin-
ue to add (a few) people up until the
point where the time remaining to com-
plete the project is equal to 0.4  50 20
working days—that is, approximately
one calendar month from the project’s
completion.6 By contrast, in our experi-
mental studies (Figure 1), the partici-
pants typically froze their hiring a lot
earlier than that (at approximately 100
days, or 5 months before completion).
The resulting optimal WCWF policy
is plotted in Figure 11 together with
NASA’s intuitive policy and the binary
strategy commonly observed in our
experiments.
The significance of this result, it is
important to emphasize, is not in its
particular value—the specific number
of months to stop hiring—since this
cannot be generalized beyond the
NASA project, but rather the process of
deriving it—using microworld-type
models for controlled experimentation.
Such models, it is encouraging to note,
can be easily customized to fit different







0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00












































Figure 10: Impacts of shifting WCWF_1 along the time axis by changing the “time parameter.”
6 As shown in Figure 8a, WCWF_1  0 at 0.4  time
parameter.
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Concluding Remarks
We draw three key insights from the
results here. First, tapping into an orga-
nization’s “mental database” can be an
invaluable source of organization-
specific knowledge and wisdom. In this
study, it was key to understanding not
only the history of an organization’s
staffing decisions, but, more impor-
tantly, it provided insight into why
project managers acted as they did, the
rationale governing their decisions, and
what information was/was not avail-
able at various decision-making points.
Indeed, as Forrester (1987) argues, an
organization’s behavior cannot be ade-
quately understood without under-
standing its mental database:
Human affairs are conducted pri-
marily from the mental database.
Anyone who doubts the dominance
of [the mental database] should
imagine what would happen to an
industrial society if it were deprived
of all knowledge in people’s heads
and if action could be guided only
by written policies and numerical
information. There is no written
description adequate for building
an automobile, or managing a fami-
ly, or governing a country. . . . If an
organization could not function
without its mental database, then I
believe its behavior cannot be
understood except through that
mental database. (Forrester, 1987)
Second, when it comes to managing
complex systems, mental models—
even if “perfect”—are not enough. A key
lesson that I hope project managers will
take away from this article is that we
should not—cannot—rely on intuition
alone in managing our projects. With its
many interrelated feedback processes
(some counteracting, some reinforcing)
project management is simply too
dynamically complex to effectively
manage by human intuition alone. The
long time delays and the many nonlinear
interactions mean that interventions
can have a multitude of consequences,
some immediate and others distant in
time and space.
Third, I sought to demonstrate the
feasibility and utility of combining 
the strengths of the manager with the
strengths of computer modeling. This
was done not only to provide us with
reliable and efficient tools to do the
necessary bookkeeping, but also to cre-
ate customized solutions to fit the
unique characteristics of our organiza-
tions. The traditional one-size-fits-all
simplistic model(s) to project manage-
ment is truly a legacy of times when we
were computationally poor. It is a
bankrupt strategy that we need to
abandon. ■
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